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Review of “Beyond and Between the Cold War blocs,” Special Issue of The 
International History Review 37:5 (December 2015), in H-Diplo Article Review Forum, 
no. 614 (May 2016) 
By Wen-Qing Ngoei, Northwestern University 
In their introduction to this special issue of The International History Review, Janick Marina 
Schaufelbuehl, Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimaki and Marco Wyss state that this collection of papers 
examines “what independent pathways” existed for peripheral states, independence movements, 
or regional alliances “within the Cold War system that were not directly subjected to the East-West 
confrontation” (902).[55] And there is, in principle, much to recommend this endeavor. As the 
introduction rightly points out, there is abundant evidence of middle and smaller powers as well as 
non-state actors who pursued their objectives through “an extensive array of strategies” that “did 
not easily fit into binary” Cold-War dynamics (901). Though the big powers exerted preponderant 
influence upon world affairs, the history of the global Cold War remains incomplete without 
acknowledging the agency of those who operated “in the Cold War, but not of it,” those who 
escaped the gravity of the superpowers’ agenda to achieve their own goals.[56] 
Thus, this collection of papers aspires to “take off the Cold War lens” and go beyond simply 
showcasing those historical actors of the Third World who resisted the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and China, or influenced the dimensions of the global conflict.[57] Indeed, several of these 
papers delve into the rivalries and alliances within the Third World, comparing the agendas and 
actions of Non-Aligned and neutral states (be they European, Asian, or African) that departed from 
the Cold-War rivalry; others shed light on under-studied multinational networks such as the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Commonwealth that at times intersected with the Cold 
War but at others secured what the introduction describes as the “leeway” to chart their own paths 
(902).[58] 
To render visible the “independent pathways” that historical actors eked out within the Cold War 
and, most importantly, show that these “pathways” were not of the Cold War, most of these papers 
hold the “independent pathways” up against East-West dynamics, using the ostensible contrast to 
make their case. This approach seems conceptually sound but there are perils in the execution. In 
several papers, the Cold-War conflict looms so large and irresistible, that what limited or short-
lived ‘leeway’ the smaller powers achieve seems to pale in its significance.[59] 
Indeed, as Sue Onslow concludes her insightful essay on the Commonwealth as a “global sub-
system” with sufficient (and underappreciated) heft to maintain a “determined stance of non-
involvement in Cold War issues,” she cautions that the Commonwealth’s “influence and activities 
should not be over-stated.”[60] To be sure, her paper argues that the Commonwealth has an 
admirable record of successful diplomatic efforts not directly subject to the Cold War, including its 
support for negotiations to end the Nigerian civil war as well as transition Bangladesh and 
Mozambique to independence. But Onslow concedes that in the face of “‘hard power’ calculations 
of the Cold War,” the Commonwealth’s “report card [was] much less impressive” (1076). When 
President Ronald Reagan authorized the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983, for example, an 
intervention intertwined with the escalating U.S.-Soviet rivalry, Onslow reveals that the 
Commonwealth Secretary-General’s “intense behind-the-scenes diplomacy” failed to forestall the 
American military intervention and could do little more than encourage Commonwealth members 
“not to endorse it” after the fact. The Commonwealth, Onslow argues, could only “exploit its filigree 
of formal and informal networks” with effectiveness when the superpowers were not directly 
invested in incorporating a particular theater of conflict into their rivalry (1076). Put another way, 
the Commonwealth’s “partial independence” appears to have bloomed neither of, nor within, the 
Cold War. 
Likewise, when Schaufelbuehl, Wyss and Bott compare the under-studied recognition policies 
undertaken by the European neutrals Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden, it is the tremendous 
gravity of the American Cold War agenda and U.S. political and economic power that 
(unfortunately) makes the deepest impression.[61] Again, this arises from using a contrast to reveal 
the ‘leeway’ that these European neutrals possessed to recognize North Korea or North Vietnam. 
The authors first remind us that the “cold war was a global conflict, in which all participants were 
confronted with either/or choices,” that even the neutrals and Non-Aligned countries “could not shy 
away from choosing sides” (1014). The paper goes on to demonstrate why, “in the wake of the 
escalation of the cold war in the Third World,” the neutrals did not and, in their own geopolitical 
calculations, could not recognize either Pyongyang or Hanoi. Switzerland, Austria and Sweden’s 
freedom to be genuinely neutral in their recognition policy was hamstrung by their “massive 
financial and commercial interests at play with West Germany” (1029), which was a function of the 
economic component of the U.S. Cold War containment strategy toward West Germany and 
Europe. As the authors point out, the European neutrals would not even “re-evaluate their 
recognition policy” toward the divided Asian states until East-West rapprochement occurred in the 
early 1970s (1029). Even then, the European neutrals only felt emboldened to dilute their Western-
orientation and forge relations with Pyongyang and Hanoi after the U.S. State Department 
indicated, and in the case of Sweden explicitly telegrammed, that it did not “attach too much 
importance” to the issue (1028). If “independent pathways” such as this only emerged when the 
United States chose not train its Cold-War lens upon the issue, then was this ‘leeway’—
conceptually and practically—truly within the Cold War? 
To be fair, Schaufelbuehl et al. in their introduction have taken utmost care in defining the spirit of 
their project. And by definition, sporadic gaps in the United States’ Cold-War fixations, lapses in 
Soviet and Chinese attention, or the perceived lack of strategic import to the big powers, certainly 
ensured that some local and regional questions during the Cold War were “not directly subject to 
the East-West confrontation” (902). Robert B. Rakove’s compelling study of Non-Aligned mediation 
(he notes that he uses the term “non-aligned… expansively”) makes the most of this definition to 
showcase the agency of middle and smaller powers of the Third World (993).[62] His paper 
underscores how Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru imbued Non-Alignment with a “peace-
making mission” as a direct retort to the “on-going fragmentation of the post-war world into blocs” 
of the Cold War (994). Mali and Ethiopia’s successful mediation of a “short but bitter border war” 
between Morocco and Algeria in October 1963 certainly resembles an “independent pathway” after 
the style that Schaufelbeuhl et al. have established. Paying close attention to the agency of post-
colonial actors, Rakove succeeds in demonstrating their “energy, morality, and creativity” in striving 
to make peace while the “industrial North” and its communist rivals waged their destructive Cold 
War (1009). 
But again, can one take for granted that all events—like the Morocco-Algeria dispute—from the 
end of World War II until 1991 fell within the Cold-War conflict? After all, Rakove shows that the 
Kennedy administration “possessed neither experience nor insight” into the Morocco-Algeria 
standoff of October 1963 that Mali and Ethiopia so ably resolved. And in words that signaled the 
absence of American strategic investment in the standoff, similar to the State Department telegram 
to Sweden mentioned above, National Security Council official Robert Komer “mused” that the 
Morocco-Algeria conflict remained “a pretty obscure situation.” Indeed, the U.S. leadership seemed 
content to exclude this troublesome “oasis” from their Cold War concerns. Mali and Ethiopia’s 
diplomatic efforts, what Rakove calls the “high water-mark” of non-aligned mediation, therefore 
unfolded outside of the Cold War context (997). 
On the flipside, when Mali and Egypt attempted to mediate the Vietnam War, a conflict decidedly 
embedded within the East-West confrontation, the two Non-Aligned nations predictably 
encountered overwhelming resistance from Beijing, Washington, and even Hanoi (1008). The stark 
difference between the minor triumphs and major failures of Non-Aligned mediation, like the 
Commonwealth’s diplomatic initiatives being frequently a ‘victim’ of ‘hard power’ Cold-War 
calculations, and the European neutrals’ sustained inability to diplomatically recognize Hanoi and 
Pyongyang, underscores a crucial problem for the study of “independent pathways” as conceived 
by Schaufelbeuhl et al. (1076). It seems that the middle-to-smaller powers found only fleeting and 
narrow “leeway” to accomplish whatever aims they harbored that were “within but not of the Cold 
War.” Worse, when the Cold War powers were determined, they usually ran roughshod over these 
“independent pathways.” Ultimately, this gives the troubling impression that the middle and smaller 
powers’ exercised all but a diminished and doomed agency within the Cold War. Of course, the 
primary goal of this study is to add to—and not supplant—what scholars have already shown of 
how peripheral actors effectively resisted and influenced the superpowers so as to “block, 
moderate, expand, or intensify” the global Cold War (902). And alongside the considerable ability 
of the middle and smaller powers to “utilize pressure stemming from Cold War relations,” this study 
of the “independent pathways” enriches our understanding of the myriad ways that less central or 
powerful states managed for a time to slip the surly bonds of the Cold-War logic. 
 
